But the grand scheme outlined in this Memorandum was not destined to be carried into effect. As the autumn advanced, it was seen that such a vast army as this project called for could not be created within any reasonable time, and that when the forces at the disposal of the Government for operations in Virginia should reach a total of 150,000 men or thereabouts, it would be wellnigh impossible to withstand the demand of the public that they should be employed.

Meantime, the situation in Washington was again becoming unsatisfactory. General McClellan had, in fact, begun to exhibit those defects of character which afterwards caused the unnecessary and serious disasters of the Peninsular campaign. The administration was becoming distrustful of him; the public was becoming uneasy. He had in August allowed the Confederates without opposition to establish their advanced posts on Hanson's Hill and other places in full view of the Capital. It is true that these detachments were withdrawn in the latter part of September, though not as the result of any step taken by the Federal army. But a still greater humiliation was in store for the country. The Confederates, about the first of October, were suffered to erect batteries at Cockpit Point and

other places on the lower Potomac, which soon practically closed the navigation of the river. That such a serious danger to the Capital should have been allowed quietly to be created struck every one with amazement. The most capable and judicious observers could not understand why the erection of the batteries could not have been prevented, nor why, with